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We show that ambiguity aversion increases the value of a statistical life as soon as the 
marginal utility of wealth is higher if alive than dead. The intuition is that ambiguity aversion 
has a similar effect as an increase in the perceived baseline mortality risk, and thus operates as 
the “dead anyway” effect. We suggest, however, that ambiguity aversion should usually have 
a modest effect on the prevention of ambiguous mortality risks within benefit-cost analysis, 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is sometimes difficult to assess with precision the risks to health and life that we 
face. For instance, there is often conflicting information about the likelihood of dying from 
new environmental or technological risks. Remember the debates about the risks related to the 
mad cow disease or to the avian flu. Due to the scientific uncertainty over the channels of 
transmission of these diseases to human beings, it was difficult to predict the number of 
fatalities. Some experts predicted a few fatalities while other experts predicted several 
thousands fatalities.  
 
Another example that can illustrate the importance of uncertainty over the expected 
number of fatalities is the climate change problem. Climate change will increase worldwide 
mortality from heat stress, malnutrition and vector-borne diseases. The World Health 
Organisation cited in the Stern review (2007) estimates that just a 1°C increase in global 
temperature could lead to at least 300,000 annual deaths from climate change (Stern, 2007, p. 
75, part II). Yet, the increase in global temperature is highly uncertain, and so are the 
predictions about the number of deaths induced by climate change. This issue is important as 
worldwide mortality costs may account for more than half of aggregate estimate of global 
warming (IPCC, 1995, p. 198). 
 
How do we react to the uncertainty on the probability of dying from a specific risk? In 
particular, do we behave as if we average the probabilities given by different experts (or 
scenarios)? Or do we tend for instance to place excessive weight on the most pessimistic one? 
The former is consistent with the standard (subjective) expected utility approach, while the 
latter is more consistent with an approach that allows for an ambiguity aversion effect. 
 
Since the seminal Ellsberg (1961)’s suggested experiment, it is a fairly robust finding 
in experiments that individuals are averse to ambiguity over probabilities. The development of 
theories of ambiguity aversion is more recent. Some influential contributions include Gilboa 
(1987), Segal (1987), Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Klibanoff (2001), 
Epstein and Schneider (2003) and Klibanoff et al. (2005). These theories have been mainly 
applied to financial risks so far.
1 For example, Chen and Epstein (2002) suggest that 
ambiguity aversion might explain the equity premium puzzle.  
 
There exist a few empirical analyses on ambiguity aversion when ambiguity concerns 
risks to life and health.
2 An example of such an analysis is Viscusi et al. (1991). They 
designed a survey in which participants were asked to choose between two living areas, A and 
B, where there is a risk of nerve disease due to environmental pollution. In the Area A, risks 
are ambiguous: one study indicated a risk level 150 cases per 1 million population, and 
another study indicated a risk level of 200 per 1 million population. Participants then were 
asked what risk in the Area B they would view as equivalent to the risk posed in the Area A.  
 
                                                 
1 Some recent exceptions include the theoretical papers by Lange (2003) on climate change policy, Chambers 
and Melkonyan (2007) on the trade of toxic products and Albis and Thibault (2007) on savings behaviour in face 
of ambiguous longevity. 
2 Ritov and Baron (1990) develop a hypothetical experiment in which they show a reluctance to vaccination 
under missing information about side effects of the vaccine. Also, Riddle and Show (2006) show, using a survey 
of Nevada residents, a substantial effect of ambiguity concerning risks from nuclear-waste transport. Shogren 
(2005) reports a survey study about a food-borne illness posing ambiguous risks; see section 7 for more details.   - 3 -     
The answers are reported in the Table 1 below. Notice that there was another treatment 
(treatment 2) in which the ambiguity concerning the risk in the Area A is increased: one study 
indicated 110 cases per 1 million population and another study indicated 240 cases per 1 
million population (thus still with a mean risk of 175 cases per 1 million). Interestingly, 
Viscusi et al. (1991) show that survey participants do not simply average baseline mortality 
risks. In treatment 1, the mean of the answers about the equivalent risk is a bit greater than the 
mean risk and equal to 178.35, while in the more ambiguous treatment 2 the mean of the 
answers is equal to 191.08. Hence, this survey study seems to indicate that participants dislike 
ambiguity and dislike greater ambiguity.
3  
 
Treatment  1  Risk levels in 
Area A:  
Mean of answers 
(sample size 65):  
 [150,  200]  178.35 
Treatment  2  Risk levels in 
Area A:  
Mean of answers 
(sample size 58): 
 [110,  240]  191.08 
Table 1 – Survey data from Viscusi, Magat and Huber (1991) 
 
This survey study raises another (unanswered) question: What is the willingness to pay 
to avoid the ambiguous risk? Indeed, ambiguity aversion is expected to have an effect on 
individuals’ monetary-equivalents in face of change in ambiguous mortality risks. Consistent 
with benefit-cost analysis, ambiguity aversion may in turn have an effect on the choice of 
prevention policies concerning risks that are ambiguous. Our objective in this paper is to 
understand this effect theoretically. More precisely, we study the theoretic impact of 
ambiguity aversion using the standard value of a statistical life (VSL) model.  
 
We consider the recent Klibanoff et al. (2005)’s theory of ambiguity aversion that 
encompasses most common theories of ambiguity cited above. Also, this theory introduces a 
simple and interpretable measure of ambiguity aversion.
4 We show that the existence of 
ambiguity over baseline mortality risks increases the VSL when the decision maker is averse 
to ambiguity. This result holds as soon as the marginal utility of wealth of the decision maker 
is higher when he is alive than when he is dead, a standard assumption in mortality risk 
models. The intuition for the result is that the ambiguity aversion effect operates as the “dead 
anyway” effect (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1996). Namely, the effect of ambiguity aversion on the 
VSL is similar to that of a perceived increase in the baseline mortality risk. Before turning to 
the presentation of the model and to the derivation of the results, we briefly discuss risk 
policy-making in the presence of ambiguity. 
 
2. Ambiguous Risks and Policy-making 
 
Some policy analysts have suggested that decision-makers tend to put more effort into 
reducing ambiguous risks compared with familiar risks. A strand of the risk policy literature 
has shown that risk policy-making is plagued with a conservatism bias. This has often been 
presented as an “irrational” response of policy-makers.  
 
                                                 
3 A related effect is documented in Viscusi (1997). He presents to participants conflicting information about an 
environmental risk, and shows that participants treat the “high risk” information as being more informative. 
4 As we will see, this theory achieves a separation between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. Besides, this 
theory is fairly tractable because preferences are “smooth” (and not kinked), and can easily be extended to state-
dependent preferences (Nau, 2006).   - 4 -     
Viscusi (1998) for instance argues that policy-makers err on the side of being too 
stringent when they face ambiguous risks, as exemplified by the higher regulation of synthetic 
risks compared to more familiar but often more severe carcinogens. Viscusi (1998) also 
explains how US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) inflates risk cut-off values for 
individual risk-exposure by computing a theoretical “maximally exposed” individual 
(combining maximal ingestion rates, maximal exposure duration and minimal body weights). 
US EPA also typically uses upper bound values (like the 95% percentile) of probability 
distributions, and routinely applies rule-of-thumb margins of safety.
5 Obviously these 
practices do not reflect the mean tendency of the risk but instead bias the risk cut-off toward 
conservatism. Moreover, when several parameters are uncertain, risk assessment can be 
severely distorted due to the combination of several upper bound values. Belzer (1991) 
computed for instance that the excess mean risk due to dioxin was overestimated by about 
5000 times by US EPA. As Viscusi and Hamilton (1999) suggest: “(t)hese biases, in effect, 
institutionalize ambiguity aversion biases” (Viscusi and Hamilton, 1999, p. 1013). Along 
similar lines, Sunstein (2000) argues that, in the presence of divergent risk scenarios, policy-
makers focus too much on the worst-case scenario, and do not account enough for the low 
probabilities involved. More generally, Sunstein (2005) argues that risk regulatory decisions 
based on a precautionary principle approach are usually inconsistent with basic principles of 
economic efficiency. 
 
Interestingly, most regulations issued by US EPA have a high implicit cost per life 
saved: it is usually higher than $10 million (Viscusi, 1998), and often a much higher figure in 
the range of hundreds of millions, or even billions dollars as was the case for the Superfund 
program (Viscusi and Hamilton, 1999). In contrast, revealed and stated preferences studies in 
developed countries in general obtain a VSL ranging from $1 to $10 million (Viscusi and 
Aldy, 2003). These observations suggest that environmental risks may have been over-
regulated. In addition, some empirical analyses have shown that environmental risks are far 
more regulated than health, occupational and transportation risks (Tengs at al., 1995; Tengs 
and Graham, 1996; Hahn, 1996). As many environmental risks may be more ambiguous risks 
than other risks, the “ambiguity premium” apparently embodied in policy-making is a good 
candidate to explain part of the observed over-regulation of environmental risks.  
 
Benefit-cost analysis is sometimes presented as a possible “corrector” for 
inconsistencies in risk regulation. It may in particular help insulate risk policies from too 
much ambiguity aversion (Viscusi, 1998; Sunstein, 2002). Nevertheless, benefit-cost analysis 
is based on individuals’ VSL. Hence, if individuals’ VSL embody ambiguity aversion, policy 
choices should somehow reflect individuals’ ambiguity aversion as well. This raises the 
following important questions for policy-making. Are the observed individual VSL estimates 
(usually ranging from $1 to $10 million) reflective of any form of ambiguity aversion? Should 
we use these VSL estimates to compute the social benefits of reducing ambiguous risks?  
 
There is little rationale to answer positively to these questions. In effect, we observe 
that VSL estimates are usually obtained either from revealed preferences studies, most often 
using wage risk differential studies or road safety studies, or from stated preferences, most 
                                                 
5 Relatedly, Adler (2007) discusses for instance what he calls the “de minimis” risk. A “de minimis” risk is a risk 
cut-off, such as the incremental 1×10
-6 lifetime cancer risk for air pollutants, or the 100-year-flood or the 475-
year-earthquake for natural hazards. Adler argues that risk cut-offs are usually instrumental for defining policy 
objectives. Moreover, a recurrent problem is that risk cut-offs is usually extremely low. As a result, it may lead 
to target extremely high safety standards, without a careful consideration of the economic costs of these 
standards.   - 5 -     
often using contingent valuation studies (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003; Dionne and Lanoie, 2004). 
However, occupational or road safety risks may arguably involve in average less ambiguity 
compared to most regulated environmental risks. Moreover, contingent valuation studies 
usually present objective probabilities to respondents, and thus do not account for ambiguity 
either. Consequently, estimated VSL usually do not seem to capture an “ambiguity premium”. 
This may lead to under-estimate the values of the VSL that are applied to the reduction of 
ambiguous risks. The objective of the paper is, in a sense, to study this last argument. 
 
3. The Value of a Statistical Life Model 
 
Let us first introduce the VSL concept through an example. Consider a society 
composed of 100,000 identical individuals. They each face a (non-ambiguous) annual 
mortality risk of 100 in a 100,000. A public prevention program can reduce this risk from 100 
to 80 expected fatalities. Moreover, it is known that each individual is willing to pay $500 for 
benefiting from this risk reduction program. In this example, the VSL would be equal to $2.5 
million. Indeed one could collect $50 million in this society to save 20 statistical lives, hence 
a $2.5 million per statistical life. Observe also the VSL is equal to the individual change in 
wealth ($500) divided by the individual change in risk (20/100,000). Hence the VSL captures 
the trade-off between a change in wealth and a change in mortality risks. 
 
We now introduce the standard static VSL model. An individual maximizes a (state-
dependent) expected utility given by 
 
V= 00 (1 ) ( ) ( ) p uw pvw −+       ( 1 )  
 
where  0 [0,1] p ∈  is the initial probability of dying, or the baseline mortality risk,  () u ⋅  is the 
utility of wealth if the individual survives the period, and  () v ⋅  is the utility of wealth if the 
individual dies, that is, the utility of a bequest. We assume that uv > , with u  (resp. v ) 
strictly increasing (resp. weakly increasing). This model was introduced by Drèze (1962), 
Jones-Lee (1974) and Weinstein et al. (1980) and has been commonly used in the literature on 
the economic valuation of risks to health to health and life (e.g., Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). 
 
Theoretically, the VSL is defined by the marginal rate of substitution between wealth 
w and baseline risk  0 p . It thus captures this tradeoff between a change in wealth and a 
change in mortality risks. Assuming that u  and v  are differentiable, we thus get the VSL by a 















.     (2) 
 
Observe that the VSL may vary across individuals since it depends on w, 0 p  and also on the 
shape of the utility functions through u  and v .  
 
                                                 
6 The VSL may also be viewed as the first-order approximation of the willingness to pay for a mortality risk 
reduction. Indeed, let the willingness to pay  0() Cz  is defined by 
00 00 0 0 ( 1 ) ( ( ) )( ) ( ( ) ) ( 1 ) () () p z u wCz p z v wCz pu w p v w −+ − + − − = − +  in which  z  is the risk reduction. We 
obviously get  00 VSL '(0) C = .   - 6 -     
In this model, the VSL increases with an increase in the baseline mortality risk (see, 
e.g., Weinstein et al., 1980). Indeed in (2) an increase in  0 p  reduces the value of the 
denominator (since  '' uv ≥ ), and thus increases the VSL. That is, the marginal cost of 
spending money decreases when the baseline risk increases. This effect has been coined the 
“dead-anyway effect” (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1996; see also Breyer and Felder, 2005). Notice 
that the dead-anyway effect can be potentially important in magnitude for large baseline 
mortality risk  0 p . Indeed, assuming there is no bequest motive ( 0 v = ), the VSL in (2) tends 
to infinity when  0 p  tends to one. Intuitively, an individual facing a large total probability of 
death has little incentive to limit his spending on mortality risk reduction since he is unlikely 
to survive and thus to have other opportunities for consumption.  
 
4. The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion 
 
In the example above the annual baseline mortality risk was unambiguous and equal to 
100 in 100,000. Suppose now that the baseline mortality risk is ambiguous (but of the same 
magnitude). Suppose for instance that the decision-maker believes that with equal probability 
either 50 or 150 individuals are expected to die out of the 100,000 individuals in this society. 
How does this ambiguity over the baseline mortality risk affect the decision-maker’s VSL? 
Clearly, if the decision-maker maximizes standard expected utility, the VSL is not affected by 
ambiguity as the (expected) baseline mortality risk equals 100 in 100,000 in both situations. 
But what does happen if the decision-maker is ambiguity averse? Does it change the VSL, 
and consequently does it change the social benefits that should be imputed to this prevention 
program? 
 
To study analytically this question, we consider the Klibanoff et al. (2005)’s model of 
ambiguity attitude. Formally, and adapting the model above, the decision maker’s utility is 
now written 
 
    
1{{ ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) } } WEp u w p v w φφ
− =− +       (3) 
 
in which  0  () [ 0 , 1 ] p p ε ≡+ ∈    is a positive random variable that represents the ambiguity over 
the baseline mortality risk, and E  denotes the expectation operator over the random variable 
ε , with  0 Eε =  . A natural interpretation of this model is that there is a two-stage lottery, first 
a subjective lottery which determines one’s baseline mortality risk  p  , and second an 
objective lottery which determines whether one is alive or dead. In short, Klibanoff et al. 
(2005) assume that preferences over these two lotteries are (subjective) expected utility 
preferences, although permitting a different risk attitude towards each lottery,
7 giving rise the 
expression of an expected utility of an expected utility. 
 
                                                 
7 Hence, Klibanoff et al. (2005) assume a unique subjective belief over the first-stage lottery, but relaxes the 
reduction axiom and thus weights the probabilities nonlinearly (see Segal, 1987; see also section 11). What does 
happen if the decision-maker faces objective lotteries, i.e., if he knows objectively the distribution of  p  ? The 
answer seems open to two different interpretations. First, when the decision-maker faces objective lotteries it 
seems that there is no behavioral reason to expect that the reduction axiom does not apply between both lotteries, 
so that we are back to expected utility maximization. Second, having a strictly formal interpretation of Klibanoff 
et al. (2005)’s theory, both lotteries are different mathematical concepts and it is possible that to expect a 
different attitude towards the first and the second stage lottery, even though both lotteries involve objective 
probabilities. This second interpretation is fairly consistent with Halevy (2007)’s experimental data.    - 7 -     
The novelty in model (3) compared to model (1) is the introduction of the increasing 
function φ  which captures the attitude towards ambiguity. More precisely, the decision-maker 
has ambiguity averse (seeking) preferences if and only if φ  is concave (convex), as shown by 
Klibanoff et al. (2005). In this framework, similar to the usual financial risk aversion which is 
captured by the concavity of the utility function u , φ  captures the attitude towards ambiguity. 
Assuming differentiability,  '' 0 φ <  thus represents strict ambiguity aversion. Two important 
particular cases of this model are constant ambiguity aversion,  ( ) (1 exp( ))/ xx φ αα = −− , and 
ambiguity neutrality,  ( ) x x φ = . Klibanoff et al. (2005)’s model yields Gilboa and Schmeidler 
(1989)’s well-known maxmin ambiguity model as a limiting case for infinitely ambiguity 
averse decision makers (α →∞).
8 But, in contrast to the Gilboa and Schmeidler’s 
framework, the Klibanoff et al.’s model distinguishes ambiguity (over a set of probability 
distributions) and ambiguity attitude. 
 
Observe that under a concave φ , utility W  is reduced in the presence of ambiguity 
over baseline mortality risks. An implication of this observation is that the willingness to pay 
C  to eliminate the mortality risk, defined by  () uw C W − = , is always higher under ambiguity 
aversion than under ambiguity neutrality. However, this result does not permit to conclude as 
to the effect of ambiguity for infinitesimally small mortality risk changes, as usually 
considered in the VSL literature. 
 
The natural extension of the VSL under ambiguity and ambiguity aversion is obtained 





'{(1 ) ( ) ( )}
'{(1 ) ( ) ( )}
dw ( ( ) ( ))
VSL
dp ((1 ) '( ) '( ))( )
uw vw
E
Ep u w p v w











  (4) 
 
Notice that, although we assume that there is ambiguity over baseline risks, there is no 
ambiguity about the (infinitely small) risk change faced by the individual.
10 Notice also that 
without ambiguity aversion (or under expected utility), that is under  ' φ  constant, we would 
get 
 
     0
() ()
VSL
((1 ) '( ) '( ))
uw vw




     (5) 
 
                                                 
8 Ju and Miao (2007) observe that when  () ( 1 e x p ( ) ) / xx φ αα = −−  the ambiguity aversion model is connected to 
the robust control theory (Hansen and Sargent, 2008). 
9 Defining again the willingness to pay  1() Cz for a risk-reduction  z  by 
11 {(1 ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))} {(1 ) ( ) ( )} Ep z u w C z p z v w C z Ep u w p v w φ φ −+ − + − − = − +    , it is easy to retrieve 
A1 VSL '(0) C = . 
10 Alternatively, one could attempt to introduce ambiguity over the risk change (as opposed to over the baseline 
risk). Consider for instance the willingness to pay  () Cz defined by the following equality: 
1
00 0 0 { { ( 1 )( () ) ( )( () ) } } ( 1 )( ) ( ) E p k zuw Cz p k zvw Cz p uw pvw φφ
− −+ − + − − = − +  . Notice that ambiguity (and 
the expectation operator) is over the random variable k  . There is thus ambiguity over the risk change kz  , and 
not about the baseline mortality risk. In that case, it is easy to see that ambiguity aversion reduces, and not 
increases, the willingness to pay  () Cz. However, ambiguity aversion has no effect on the approximated 
willingness to pay for a small risk change, that is  '(0) C .    - 8 -     
which is strictly equal to the expression in (2) since  0 Ep p =  .  
 
Our objective is to use this framework to examine the effect of ambiguity aversion on 
the VSL. Comparing (4) and (5), it is immediate that the VSL is higher with ambiguity 
aversion than with ambiguity neutrality if and only if the following inequality holds: 
 
'{( (( 1 1) ' ( ) ' ( ) )
((1 ) '( ) '
)( ) ( ) }
'{(1 ) ( ) ( )} ( ))( )
Ep u w p v w
Ep
Ep u w p v w













Straightforward computations then show that this inequality holds true if and only if 
(1 ) '( ) '( ), ( ' { ( 1 ) () () } ) 0 COV p pu uw p v w pw wv φ + + −− ≤    . That is, using the well-known 
covariance rule,
11 if and only  ' φ  is decreasing, assuming  '' uv ≥ . Hence, provided death 
reduces the marginal utility of wealth, ambiguity aversion always reduces the VSL.
12 This is 
the main result of the paper. Notice that this result directly extends to an increase in ambiguity 
aversion in the sense defined by Klibanoff et al. (2005): a “more concave” φ  always leads to 
increase VSL (see the appendix for the derivation of this result). 
 
5. An Intuition based on the Dead-anyway Effect 
 
As we said in the introduction, the intuition for the result is based on the dead-anyway 
effect. To see this, let us consider for simplicity a discrete distribution of baseline mortality 
risks. Assume so that the random baseline mortality risk  p   takes a value  i p  with a 




= = ∑  (remember also that  0 1
n
ii i Ep q p p
= = = ∑  ). Let us then rewrite 
the VSL under ambiguity aversion 
 
A
(( ) ( ) )
VSL ˆ((1 ) '( ) '( ))
uw vw




     (6) 
 
where the operator  ˆ E is taken with respect to the new probability distribution of the baseline 
mortality risks given by : 
 
    
'{(1 ) ( ) ( )}

















 for all  1,..., in =    (7) 
 
Then, using the covariance rule again for discrete random variables, it is straightforward to 
show that  ˆ Ep Ep ≥   if and only if φ  is concave.  
 
                                                 
11 Assume that  () f p  is increasing in  p. The covariance rule states that  ), ( (( ) ) 0 pg COV f p ≤   , that is 
)( ) ( () ( ) Ef p Ef p pE g pg ≥    , for all  p   if and only if  () g p  is decreasing. See, e.g., Kimball (1951). 
12 Notice that we compared two different individuals, an ambiguity averse individual and an ambiguity neutral 
individual, keeping the level of ambiguity the same. Consider now only an ambiguity averse individual, but 
instead vary the level of ambiguity. Assume that in one situation there is ambiguity over baseline mortality risk 
and that in the other there is no ambiguity in the sense that the probability is known to be equal to  0 () pE p =  . 
Then it is immediate to show, using the same demonstration, that ambiguity over probabilities reduces the VSL 
under  '' uv ≥ . Hence, VSL is higher under ambiguity than under no ambiguity.   - 9 -     
Ambiguity over baseline mortality risks thus leads the ambiguity averse decision 
maker to behave in a way that is consistent with a perceived increase of a baseline mortality 
risk, from Ep   to  ˆ Ep  . In other words,  ˆ Ep   is the certain baseline mortality risk so that the 
decision maker has the same VSL as in the ambiguous situation. Technically, a new 
probability  ˆi q  is associated to each baseline mortality risk  i p , 1,..., in = . Compared to the 
initial probability  i q , observe that the new probability  ˆi q  is actually “weighted” by the 
quantity '{(1 ) ( ) ( )}/ '{(1 ) ( ) ( ))} ii i p uw pvw E puw p vw ω φφ ≡− + − +  . Importantly, notice that 
this weight is larger the larger  '{(1 ) ( ) ( )} ii p uw pvw φ − +  is, that is, the larger  i p  is. In other 
words, the new probability  ˆi q  attributes respectively more weight to larger baseline mortality 
risks. Notice also that this weight which affects the perceived increase in the baseline risk 
depends on individual characteristics ( , , , ) uvw φ . 
 
This intuition helps understand why the condition  '' uv ≥  is instrumental for 
ambiguity aversion to have a positive effect on VSL. Indeed the “dead anyway” effect rests 
on the assumption that wealth has a higher marginal value if alive than dead. This assumption 
seems sensible, and is usually accepted without much discussion. Nevertheless, this suggests 
that the same result cannot usually be obtained for pure financial risks. Indeed, under risk-
averse preferences, the marginal utility is higher in the bad state than in the good state. This 
would basically reverse the result we obtained.
13 Along these lines, the effect of ambiguity 
over baseline risks to health (nonfatal risks) would also depend on how health status affects 
the marginal utility of consumption. Indeed if health status increases the marginal utility of 
wealth (see, e.g., Viscusi and Evans, 1994), then our result carries over. 
 
6. Equivalent Certain Baseline Mortality Risks 
 
In the introduction, we mentioned the survey study developed by Viscusi et al. (1991). 
This study asked respondents to state the certain baseline mortality risk they would judge as 
equivalent to the ambiguous risk they face. We coin it the “utility-equivalent” certain baseline 
mortality risk. Formally, let us denote  p  this utility-equivalent mortality risk; it is given by 
the following equation:  
 
1 ( 1 ) () () { { ( 1 ) () () } } puw p vw E puw p vw φφ
− −+ = −+      (8) 
 
  One may then wonder how  p  compares to the “VSL-equivalent” baseline mortality 
risk, now denoted  ˆ ˆ p Ep ≡  , that we derived in the previous section. After simple 
manipulations, it is easy to see that  
 
  
( ( 1 ) () () )' { ( 1 ) () () }
ˆˆ (1 ) ( ) ( )
'{(1 ) ( ) ( )}
E puw p vw puw p vw
puw p vw










so that we get  ˆ p p ≥  if and only if 
                                                 
13 Let  () ( ) vw uw L =−  and assume that the financial loss  L  is positive. Then  '( ) vw is larger than  '( ) uw under 
u  concave. Our result then tells us that the willingness to pay for a small reduction in the (ambiguous) 
probability of loss is reduced, and not increased, under ambiguity aversion. Our intuition for this (maybe 
surprising) result is that a higher willingness to pay would further decrease the final wealth in the case of loss. 
This effect is disliked by risk-averters, and has precisely more weight under ambiguity aversion.   - 10 -     
 
 
1 ( ( 1 ) () () (' { ( 1 ) () () }
{{ ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) } }
'{(1 ) ( ) ( )}
E puw p vw puw p vw
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for all  p  , u  and v . This last inequality is equivalent to  
 
    
1 '{ }












     ( 1 1 )  
 
  This inequality is in fact always true under φ  concave. To see this, we use a result 
derived in Watt (2008). Let the following function  ˆ () { ( 1 )} gE x x λ φλ λ = +−   with  ˆ x being the 
certainty equivalent of x  , or  ˆ {} {} x Ex φ φ =  . Since  ( ) g λ  is concave in λ  under φ  concave, 
we have  ( ) (0) (1 ) (1) (0) gg g g λ λλ ≥+ − =  for any  [0,1] λ∈ . Thus we must have  '{0} 0 g ≥ , 
which is equivalent to inequality (11). 
 
  We have thus shown that the utility-equivalent certain baseline mortality risk is always 
lower than the VSL-equivalent certain baseline mortality risk. An illustration of this result 
may be provided using Viscusi et al. (1991)’s survey study. Remember that subjects 
participating in treatment 2 judged the certain 191 in 1 million risk to be strictly equivalent to 
an ambiguous risk of either 110 or 240 in 1 million risk. Then, the theoretical result just 
derived predicts that those subjects are expected to have a VSL in the ambiguous risk case to 
be at least greater than the VSL they would have for the certain 191 in a million baseline 
mortality risk, and even if the mean of the baseline risk is equal to 175.  
 
  We have thus shown that ambiguity aversion increases the VSL. Also, we have 
derived a result useful to compute a lower bound for the VSL in the ambiguous risk case. This 
suggests that ambiguity aversion may possibly have an important effect on the VSL. 
However, in the next section, we will suggest using a numerical illustration that the effect of 
ambiguity aversion should be in general rather limited.  
 
7. A Numerical Illustration 
 
The few papers about ambiguity over risks to life and health mentioned in the 
introduction have not elicited monetary equivalents. The only study to do so (that we are 
aware of) is a survey study mentioned in Shogren (2005) about a food-borne pathogen, 
Salmonella. This survey study compares monetary equivalents for risk elimination under non-
ambiguous and ambiguous probabilities scenarios. Interestingly, Shogren (2005) reports that 
“mean willingness-to-pay responses were higher for ambiguous versus unambiguous 
scenarios for all probabilities for food safety, but these differences were not significantly 
different. This survey has provided evidence that people prefer unambiguous risks for food 
safety, but not enough to generate a significant difference” (Shogren, 2005, p. 125-26).  
 
We will now briefly illustrate our theoretic result using some of the figures reported in 
Shogren (2005). We also use some arbitrary utility functions and parameters. We first assume 
a constant relative risk aversion utility function 
11 () ( 1 ) uw w
γ γ
− − =−  with  [0,1[ γ ∈ ,
14 with no 
bequest motive, that is  0 v = . In that case, the VSL is simply equal to 
-1 1
0 w(1- ) (1 ) p γ
− − . To 
                                                 
14 Parameter γ  less than 1 guarantees uv > .    - 11 -     
illustrate, if we take a square root utility function  () uw w =  and a lifetime wealth of $1 
million, the VSL equals $2 million for a zero baseline mortality risk. Notice also that the VSL 
increases nonlinearly with this baseline mortality risk. As we said above, the VSL tends to 
infinity when  0 p  tends to 1, truly the “dead anyway” effect. We thus expect the effect of 
ambiguity aversion to strongly depend on where the baseline mortality risk is located.
15 
Finally, we will assume a constant ambiguity aversion, that is  ( ) (1 exp( ))/ xx φ αα = −−  for 
0 α >  (and  ( ) x x φ =  for  0 α = ). 
 
We further assume, as in one treatment of the study reported in Shogren (2005), that 
the baseline mortality risk is either equal to  1 1/666 p =  or to  2 1/2000 p =  with equal 
probability. We thus have  1/1000 Ep =  . With these values, we obtain for instance 
ˆ 1.23/1000 Ep =   for  0.5 α = . Moreover,  ˆ Ep   tends asymptotically to 1/666 for α  large; 
namely, under extreme ambiguity aversion the decision maker will behave as if he would face 
the “worst-case” baseline mortality risk. Interestingly, in this example the impact of 
ambiguity aversion on the VSL is always modest, even under extreme ambiguity aversion. 
Indeed, the change from  1/1000 Ep =   to  ˆ 1/666 Ep =   leads to an increase of the VSL (of 
about $2 million) by a mere $1000. Notice that this numerical illustration is somehow 
consistent with the results of a modest effect of ambiguous probabilities reported in Shogren 
(2005).  
 
In contrast, assume that the baseline mortality risk is either very high and equal to 
1 1/2 p =  (50% chance of dying) with a small 1/999 probability, or equal to  2 1/2000 p = . 
Notice that we still have  1/1000 Ep =  . For these new values, we obtain that  ˆ Ep   is (almost) 
equal to 1/2 for  0.5 α = , and so is the case for higher values of α . Hence, the effect is similar 
to an increase from  1/1000 Ep =   to  ˆ 1/2 Ep =  . The VSL thus almost doubles due to an 
ambiguity aversion effect. Consequently, the possibility of a high baseline mortality risk, even 
if this possibility is very unlikely, may significantly increase the VSL. 
 
  This numerical exercise based on arbitrary functional forms and arbitrary parameters 
suggests that the effect of ambiguity aversion is usually modest, unless there is a possibility of 
an extremely high baseline mortality risk, and a large ambiguity aversion. We believe that this 
insight should carry over in most “regular” numerical exercises. Indeed, the usual modest 
effect of ambiguity aversion on the VSL is due to the limited impact of the baseline mortality 
risk on the VSL in general. In other words, ambiguity aversion is expected to have usually a 
modest impact on the VSL because the dead-anyway effect is usually small (unless the 
probability of death is extraordinary high). We are thus tempted to conclude that ambiguity 
aversion can hardly justify a priori the very high implicit cost per life saved of some public 
environmental programs (e.g., several hundreds of millions dollars per life saved), even 
accounting for the fact that these public programs can reduce ambiguous risks. 
 
8. Differentiated Risk Changes 
 
                                                 
15 Using the expression 
-1 1
0 w(1- ) (1 ) p γ
− −  for the VSL, notice that the elasticity of the VSL with respect to the 
baseline mortality risk is equal to  00 /(1 ) pp − . The VSL is thus quite sensitive to a change in  0 p  only for high 
values of  0 p .    - 12 -     
Let us assume now that there are n equally likely baseline mortality risks 





{{ ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) } }
n




= −+ ∑     ( 1 2 )  
 
The previous analysis assumed that a (infinitesimal) risk change applies uniformly to 
all s i p . This may be viewed as somehow restrictive, as risk changes might possibly affect 
differently each baseline mortality risk  i p . We call a “differentiated risk change”, a change in 
risk that is different across the  s i p . An example of a differentiated risk change is a prevention 
measure such that the risk reduction is strictly positive when  p   is equal to  1 p , and 0 
otherwise. Namely, the prevention measure is only efficient in the worst-case scenario leading 
to the maximal baseline mortality risk.
16  
 
Notice first that, within the expected utility framework, only the change in the 
expected baseline mortality risk matters. Hence, a similar risk change applied differently to a 
low or to a large baseline mortality risk would have exactly the same monetary-equivalent 
value to the decision-maker. However, this need not be the case under ambiguity aversion. 
Technically, this is due to the fact that the objective in (12) is non-linear in the  s i p  under 
ambiguity aversion. 
 
To further study this problem, we denote VSL
i  the marginal rate of substitution 
between wealth and a change in the baseline mortality risk  i p ,
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 The  quantity 
i VSL  should be interpreted as the monetary-equivalent value associated 
to an infinitesimal change in risk contingent to the baseline mortality risk  i p . The expression 
of 
i VSL  is useful to understand how the decision maker would want the risk reduction to be 
differentiated, and to which extent this differentiation depends on ambiguity aversion. Indeed, 
it is immediate to obtain that the difference 
ji VSL-VSL  has the sign of 
' { ( 1 )( ) ( ) } ' { ( 1 )( ) ( ) } jj i i p uw pvw p uw pvw φ φ −+− −+, and is thus positive when  ji p p ≥  
under ambiguity aversion.  
 
Consequently, ambiguity aversion unsurprisingly leads the decision maker to value 
more a risk reduction contingent on the highest baseline mortality risk  1 p , rather than any 
similar risk reduction contingent to another baseline mortality risk. Ambiguity aversion may 
thus rationalize a focus on the worst-case scenario in public prevention programs, even 
assuming a mild ambiguity aversion of the decision-maker. Notice, however, that we have 
only discussed the benefit side of prevention measures. A full examination of how the 
                                                 
16 Another example is when an intervention reduces the risk by a constant fraction (e.g., if it reduces exposure to 
a risk by half). 
17 The notations are a bit loose here. Differentiating with respect to  i p  means differentiating with respect to  0 p  
in  0 ii ppε =+ , keeping all  0s p  constant in all  , j pji ≠ .   - 13 -     
decision maker would optimally select the “differentiation” of risk changes must account for 
the relative cost of these measures. 
 
9. A Self-protection Model 
 
  We have studied so far how ambiguity aversion affects the monetary-equivalent value 
of some prevention measures. The objective of this section is to study how ambiguity aversion 
affects individual prevention choices. To do so, we need to be more general about how 
prevention efforts lead to a risk reduction of the baseline mortality risks. We capture this by 
introducing the function  ( ) i p e , that represents how the baseline mortality risk varies with the 
prevention effort. We assume that more prevention effort decreases the baseline mortality risk 
'( ) 0 i pe < , at a decreasing rate  ''( ) 0 i pe ≥ . The objective of the decision maker is to choose 
the prevention effort e to maximize 
 
1
1 {{ ( 1 ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) } }
n
ii i i qp e u w e p e v w e φφ
−
= −− + − ∑      ( 1 4 )  
 
  This is a simple state-dependent self-protection model with ambiguity aversion. It is 
easy to see that  ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ii i ge peu w e pe v w e ≡− −+ − is concave in e under the 
assumption that u  and v  are concave, which implies that the program in (14) is concave as 
well under this assumption and under ambiguity aversion. The first order condition 
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    (15) 
 
It is easy to see then that ambiguity aversion raises the optimal prevention effort compared to 
ambiguity neutrality if and only if the left hand side of (15) is higher than the same expression 
assuming ' φ  constant.  
 
In order to compare with the results obtained before, assume that the baseline 
mortality risk takes an additive form, given by  ( ) ( ) ii p ep r e = −  (with 0 ( ) i re p ≤≤  for 
1,..., in = ). Then, it is straightforward (using similar manipulations as above including the use 
of the covariance rule) to prove that ambiguity aversion always increases the prevention 
effort, under  '' uv ≥ . This result is not a surprise. If an individual who is ambiguity averse 
does always value more a marginal unit of prevention (implying a higher VSL) than an 
ambiguity neutral individual, she should also select a higher level of prevention.  
 
However, the result that ambiguity aversion always increases the prevention effort is 
not general. Indeed, the comparative static analysis depends on the form of  ( ) i p e . To see this, 
assume for instance that the baseline mortality risk has a specific multiplicative form, given 
by ( ) 1 ( ) ii p es e ρ =−  (with 0 1/ ( ) i se ρ ≤≤  for  1,..., in = ), and assume also that there is no 
bequest motive  0 v = . Then, it is easy to show that (15) simply reduces to  
 
     
() ' ( )
1
'( ) ( )
uw es e




      ( 1 6 )  
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Consequently, ambiguity aversion has strictly no effect on the prevention effort in this 
case. Our intuition for this result is that an increase in the prevention effort, although reducing 
the expected baseline mortality risk, also increases the level of ambiguity faced by the agent. 
Formally, an increase in e increases the survival probability  ( ) ise ρ  (remember that  '( ) 0 se>  
by assumption), which is itself ambiguous. An increase in e thus operates as an increase in 
the spread of the ambiguity support in this case. In contrast, when the baseline mortality risk 
is additive a change in e does not affect the level of ambiguity. 
 
The analysis of this self-protection model thus indicates that the VSL model that we 
have studied before captures solely an aspect of the relationship between prevention motives 
and ambiguity aversion. In particular, we have considered a specific model in which the initial 
situation is ambiguous but the effect of the actions of prevention is not ambiguous (see also 
the discussion in the footnote 9). It is thus important to keep in mind that ambiguity aversion 
may not systematically increase the value of a public prevention program that decreases an 
ambiguous risk if the effects of this program are themselves ambiguous. 
 
10. An Alternative Characterization of Ambiguity Aversion  
 
The above analysis has considered the Klibanoff et al. (2005)’s theory of ambiguity 
aversion that encompasses most existing ambiguity theories, introduces a measure of 
ambiguity aversion, and achieves a separation between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. The 
recent Gadjos et al. (2007)’s theory of ambiguity also shares these fine properties, but is based 
on another axiomatics. The purpose of this section is to show that our results extend to this 
alternative theory of ambiguity.  
 
Under Gadjos et al. (2007)’s theory, the decision maker’s utility can be written  
 
11 (1 )( ((1 ) ( ) ( ))) ((1 ) ( ) ( )) E puw p vw p uw pvw α α −−++ −+      (17) 
 
in which α  is the parameter of ambiguity aversion (or “imprecision aversion”) and  1 p  still 
denotes the highest baseline mortality risk. This framework, already suggested by Ellsberg 
(1961, p. 664 and 665), thus considers a linear combination of the minimum of expected 
utility and of the expected utility. 
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dw u w v w
dp E p u w pv w p u w p v w αα
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with  1 *( 1 ) p Ep p α α =− +  . Notice first that the equivalent certain baseline mortality risk  * p  
does not depend on individual characteristics (utility, wealth), except on the level of 
ambiguity aversion α . 
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Most notably, it is then immediate that  I VSL  increases with the parameter of 
ambiguity aversion α , provided  '' uv ≥ . Consequently, in this framework as well, ambiguity 
aversion raises the VSL as soon as the marginal utility of wealth is higher if alive than dead. 
Moreover, the intuition is similar since ambiguity aversion effect also operates as the “dead 
anyway” effect, through a perceived change of the baseline risk from  0  () Ep p =   to  * p . 
Finally, it is immediate to see that there is no difference between the utility-equivalent 
baseline mortality risk and the VSL-equivalent baseline mortality risk, unlike in the previous 
framework based on Klibanoff et al. (2005)’s theory of ambiguity aversion. This observation 
may suggest a simple way to discriminate empirically between the two theories of ambiguity 
that we have considered in this paper in the context of risks to life and health. 
 
11. Rank-dependent Expected Utility Models and Ambiguity Aversion 
 
An important class of non-expected utility model is the rank-dependent expected 
utility (RDEU) model. This model generalizes (1): 
 
     00 (1 ) ( ) (1 (1 )) ( ) gp u w gp v w −+ − −      ( 2 0 )  
 
in which  (.) g  is usually coined the decision weight function (Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987). 
When (.) g  is linear, we are back to the expected utility model. When  (.) g  is convex, it can be 
shown that the decision-maker is averse to any mean-preserving spread under a concave state-
independent utility function (Chew et al., 1987). Under these preferences, the VSL equals
18  
 




'(1 )( ( ) ( ))
VSL
(1 ) '( ) (1 (1 )) '( )
gp u w v w




    (21) 
 
Segal (1987) builds on RDEU models to explain the Ellsberg’s paradox. Segal was the 
first to suggest that an ambiguous lottery may be viewed as a two-stage lottery, where the 
first, imaginary, stage is over the possible values of  p . More formally, Segal’s preferences 
are based on two assumptions: first, Segal assumes that the decision-maker applies the RDEU 
model to any lottery, but second he relaxes the axiom of reduction of compound lotteries 
between the first-stage and the second-stage lottery.
19 Ambiguity aversion then reduces to a 
complex property on  (.) g  (see Theorem 4.2, Segal, 1987, p. 185). Interestingly, Halevy 
(2007) observes that more than one third of subjects in his experiment seem to exhibit a 
pattern of choices consistent with Segal’s preferences. 
 
In the rest of this section, we show by an example that the characterization of 
ambiguity aversion in the sense of Segal (1987) need not lead to an increase in the VSL. In 
this example, we assume that there are only two possible baseline risks  1 p  and  2 p  (with 
                                                 
18 See also Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2006). This expression makes it clear the type of conditions such that VSL 
is higher under RDEU than under expected utility. Assume that  (.) 0 v = , then  RDEU VSL  is higher than  0 VSL  if 
and only if that  '( ) ( )/ g pg p p ≥ , that is  () / g pp  increasing in  p. This condition is weaker than  (.) g  convex, 
and corresponds to the notion of  (.) g  “star-shaped at 0” defined in Chateauneuf et al. (2004). 
19 Segal (1987) observes that if a sufficiently long time passes between the two stages of the lottery, there is no 
reason to believe in the reduction axiom. A related interpretation of irreducibility of compound lotteries is that of 
a preference for a timing of resolution of uncertainty (see, e.g., Kreps and Porteus, 1978).   - 16 -     
probability  2 q ) assuming  12 p p > , and we also assume that there is no bequest motive. Under 
these assumptions, the utility under Segal’s preferences reduces to  
 
    22 2 1 ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ( )) (1 ) ( ) gq g p uw gq g p uw −+ − −    (22) 
 
We then compute the VSL under these preferences, to get: 
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   (23) 
 
Then, we assume  2 0.5 q = ,  0 0.5 p =  with  1 0.5 p ε = +  and  2 0.5 p ε = − . Finally, we compute 
the difference between  S VSL  and  RDEU VSL  computed with 
2 () gp p = . It is straightforward 
to obtain that this difference is equal to: 
 
      2
4(1 4 ) ( )







      ( 2 4 )  
 
which is positive, and then negative for some increasing values of  in [0,0.5] ε . The key point 
here is that 
2 () gp p =  is consistent with the conditions for ambiguity aversion exhibited in 
Segal (1987)’s Theorem 4.2. Hence, this example shows that ambiguity aversion may actually 
lead to reduce the VSL. 
 
12. Risk Preferences and the VSL 
 
This paper is not the first to analyze the theoretic effect of risk preferences on the 
VSL. Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2004) show that financial risk aversion usually have an 
ambiguous effect on the VSL. In contrast, we have shown that ambiguity aversion always 
increases the VSL. A simple implication of this observation is that effect of ambiguity 
aversion need not reinforce that of risk aversion (Gollier, 2006) to understand the tradeoff 
between money and mortality risks.
20 
 
Studying the effect of risk preferences on the VSL is relevant both for revealed and 
stated preferences approach. It may permit for instance to better understand the self-selection 
bias induced by the revealed preferences approach when individuals make risk-exposure 
choices (e.g., living in a specific polluted area) posing ambiguous risks to life and health. 
Also, the VSL obtained from survey studies may be sensitive to the pieces of information that 
are delivered to participants in surveys. As shown by Viscusi et al. (1991), the communication 
of ambiguous risk information may have an effect on partipants’ responses. As a result, it may 
be interesting to estimate the effect of ambiguity aversion on the VSL obtained in future 
survey studies. More generally, it is important to better understand the economic 
consequences related to the behavioral responses of information policies about ambiguous 
risks.  
 
A more fundamental question arises, however, when one compares the effect of risk 
aversion and that of ambiguity aversion. While risk aversion has long been considered as a 
                                                 
20 We must add, however, that the classical Pratt (1964)’s concept of comparative risk aversion is not clear-cut 
under state-dependent preferences (Karni, 1983).   - 17 -     
part of the welfare of individuals, the same is not necessarily true for ambiguity aversion. It is 
known that some theories of ambiguity aversion may lead to time-inconsistent choices, to 
some conceptual difficulties in beliefs’ updating and to a negative value of information. This 
may not be a problem for the descriptive power of ambiguity aversion theories, but this raises 
some legitimate concerns for benefit-cost analysis and more generally for welfare analysis.  
 
A related policy argument is that the primary objective should be the reduction of the 
expected number of deaths. Yet, policy-makers could certainly save more lives by targeting 
familiar risks compared to ambiguous risks. Hence allowing for an ambiguity premium in 
policy-making may lead to a “statistical murder” (Graham, 1995). A classical counter-
argument however is that what should matter is the additional welfare gain associated with the 
policy, even if this policy does not maximize the total number of lives saved. It is indeed 
perfectly reasonable to argue that reducing the fear associated with ambiguous risks has a 





Many mortality risks are ambiguous. The sources of ambiguity are multiple. They may 
include scientific uncertainty, problems of communication and credibility, or lack of 
information about individual heterogeneous risk exposures and differences in susceptibility 
(e.g., genetics). There is a need to better understand the economic implications of ambiguity 
aversion. In particular, it is known that emotional fearful situations, like life-threatening 
situations, may lead individuals to react to probabilities and outcomes in a manner that is 
different from that postulated by expected utility (see, e.g., Loewenstein, 2007). Ambiguity 
aversion may potentially play an important role in these situations. It may strongly affect the 
valuation of health and mortality risks changes.  
 
We have demonstrated that ambiguity aversion increases the value of a statistical life. 
Ambiguity aversion may thus possibly justify the observed “over-regulation” of some 
environmental risks. But how much “over-regulation” is justified? We urge to obtain better 
empirical estimates of individuals’ ambiguity aversion. Interestingly, our first numerical 
analysis suggests that the effect of ambiguity aversion should be small. This paper thus does 
not justify much over-regulation of ambiguous risks. It rather supports the view that we 
should “debias” risk regulatory decisions from too much ambiguity aversion. But, clearly, 
more theoretical and empirical research is needed on this topic in order to be more confident 
in this policy recommendation. More fundamentally, the welfare implications of the effects of 
ambiguity aversion should be discussed with great caution. 
                                                 
21 Interestingly, Camerer et al. (2007), using the technique of fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), 
show that some subjects’ brain areas like the amygdala are more active under the ambiguity conditions in their 
experiment. They go on to notice that the “amygdala has been specifically implicated in processing information 
related to fear” (Camerer et al., 2007, p. 131).   - 18 -     
Appendix: Comparative Ambiguity Aversion  
 
The main result derived in the paper compares an ambiguity averse to an ambiguity 
neutral individual (or an expected utility maximizer). This appendix shows that this result 
extends to the notion of a comparison with a “more ambiguity averse” decision maker.  
 
Consider two agents, 1 and 2. Assume that they share the same underlying state-dependent 
utility functions, the same wealth and the same subjective beliefs. Following Klibanoff et al. 
(2005), agent 2 is said to be more ambiguity averse than an agent 1 if and only there exists an 
increasing and concave function T  so that  21 () T φ φ =  in the relevant domain.  
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where  1'{.} φ  stands for  1 (1 ) '( ) ' } {) '( p uw p vw φ −+  . But, using (7), notice that we can write 
 
1
(( ) ( ) )
VSL ˆ((1 ) '( ) '( ))
uw vw











(( ) ( ) )
VSL ˆ((1 ) '( )
ˆ '( {.})
'( {.} ') ) ( ))(
E uw vw








   (A4) 
 
Moreover, notice then that comparing eqn. (A3) and eqn. (A4) is similar to comparing eqn. 
(5) and eqn. (4) where E is replaced by  ˆ E and  ' φ  is replaced by  1 '( {.}) T φ . We are thus done 
if and only if  1 '( {.}) T φ  is decreasing in its argument provided  '' uv ≥ . And this is precisely 
the case if and only if T  is concave. This shows that T  concave is sufficient for the result. 
The necessity part of the proof is straightforward. 
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